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Abstract
In this contribution I summarily review the changes to the European Insolvency 
Regulation (‘EIR’). The new Regulation, 2015/848,1 will apply to insolvency pro-
ceedings opened after 26 June 2017. It repeals Regulation 1346/2000.2 I will use ‘EIR 
2015’ for the new Regulation and ‘former EIR’ when I refer to Regulation 1346/2000. 
In reviewing the changes, I have given readers uninitiated with the Regulation some 
context to the core provisions and ambitions of the Regulation. However this article 
is not meant to provide general instruction into the EIR as a whole.3
As a prelimina ry note, the Regulation’s official title is a bit of a misnomer. The 
title of the Regulation is simply ‘Regulation [number] on insolvency proceedings’. 
However the Regulation does not harmonise substantive insolvency law. It is an 
instrument of private international law, harmonising jurisdictional rules, applicable 
law and recognition and enforcement of judgments in insolvency matters.
1. Legislative History
1.1 The Development of Regulation 1346/2000
Insolvency proceedings by their nature almost always involve a multitude of stake-
holders, and the subject-matter of the multitude of claims is much more varied than 
in the average private international law scenario.4
There are two core approaches to insolvency and private international law. ‘Uni-
versality’ argues that against one particular insolvent person (whether he is a private 
individual or an undertaking), only one insolvency procedure ought to be opened. 
* Professor in the University of Leuven and independent legal practitioner. <http://www.gavclaw.
com>.
1 OJ [2015] L141/19.
2 OJ [2000] L160/1.
3 For more detailed background, see the Insolvency Chapter in G van Calster, European Private 
International Law (2nd ed. Oxford, Hart, 2013); G Moss, IF Fletcher, and S Isaacs (eds.), The EC 
Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings (2nd edition, Oxford, OUP, 2009); B Wessels, International 
Insolvency Law (3rd edition, The Hague, Kluwer, 2012).
4 For a good illustration see the United Kingdom Supreme Court in Rubin v. Eurofinance SA [2012] 
UKSC 46 (not within the scope of the Insolvency Regulation as none of the debtors had their centre 
of commercial interest in the EU). 
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This one procedure would then (have to) include all debts and assets, and decisions 
reached in its course ought to be recognised by all other jurisdictions. In its purest 
form, universality combines universality of effects, with unity of proceedings. The 
often used term ‘lex concursus’ is more or less uniquely5 attached to the universality 
doctrine. It refers to the law of the place where insolvency proceedings have been 
opened (‘concursus’, as a variety of claims ‘concur’), and hints at the standard Gleich-
lauf between forum and applicable law in insolvency proceedings: the court which 
has jurisdiction to hear the case, also applies its own laws to the case.
The territorial approach to insolvency proceedings focuses on the location of the 
assets: an insolvency proceeding may /must be opened in each State where the insol-
vent has assets, and, in its purest form any consequences of such proceeding are 
limited to the territory concerned: territoriality of effects and plurality of proceedings.
One does not really ‘support’ one theory or the other. Rather, universality is what 
one aspires to; territoriality is the interim (potentially ultimate) reality. The universal 
approach can only work when other States accept the exclusivity of the proceedings 
in a different State, and are happy to attach consequences to the findings of those 
proceedings. This requires bi- or multilateral agreements and eventually a global 
approach to insolvency proceedings.
Insolvency was exempt from the 1968 Brussels Convention,6 historically th e pio-
neer of European private international law. This was evidently not because it was not 
deemed to have any relevance to business. Rather it was seen to be of such high rel-
evance to cross-border business, that it required a specific, tailor-made regime. Unlike 
the majority of issues dealt with in the Brussels Convention (and the subsequent Brus-
sels I Regulation), the subject of insolvency proceedings by its nature almost always 
involves a multitude of stakeholders, and the subject-matter of the multitude of claims 
is much more varied than in the average contractual or non-contractual private inter-
national law situation.
There have been plenty of attempts to come to a Convention in the insolvency 
field.7 In May 1996 one was very nearly there. The entry into force of the 23 Novem-
ber 1995 Convention o n insolvency proceedings8 was made subjec t to ratification by 
all fifteen Member States at the time,9 within a period of 6 months. This period lapsed 
on 24 May 1996 without the United Kingdom having ratified (due to strategic quar-
rels over the institutional position of Gibraltar, and the lingering animosity between 
the UK and the other Member States over the fall-out of the BSE crisis). Having nearly 
succeeded, it would of course have been foolish not to somehow recycle the 1995 
5 Grammatically of course there is no reason why ‘lex concursus’ could not also apply to the ter-
ritoriality doctrine, however standard terminology is such to reserve it for the universality doctrine.
6 Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, 
[1972] OJ L299/32.
7 See the overview in Moss, G., Fletcher, I.F., and Isaacs, S (eds.), n 3 above, p 2 ff.
8 It can be downloaded from the Archives of European Integration, e.g. via <http://aei.pitt.edu/ 
2840/>.
9 Art. 49(3): ’This Convention shall not enter into force until it has been ratified, accepted or 
approved by all the Member States of the European Union as constituted on the date on which this 
Convention is closed for signature.’
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text. The ‘Insolvency Regulation’, Regulation 1346/2000,10 by default has become a 
global focal point for attempts to reach a multilateral approach to jurisdiction and 
applicable law in insolvency proceedings. There is no global or truly multilateral 
equivalent of the Regulation. Especially given the use of some of the core concepts 
of the Regulation (first and foremost the ‘Centre of Main Interest – COMI, as the 
main jurisdictional driver) in other jurisdictions, too, their interpretation by courts of 
the Member States under the guidance of the European Court of Justice, has become 
of global interest.11
Interestingly, given the collapse of the 1995 Convention at the last moment only, 
it already had all the trimmings of EU private international law Conventions, includ-
ing the accompanying ‘Report’, in this case the Virgos-Schmit Report.12 The Report 
neve r having been formally adopted, it has nevertheless considerable influence in the 
application of the Insolvency Regulation, and is quoted to that effect by the European 
Court of Justice. This awkwardness is made more poignant by the legal basis of the 
Regulation. In the five-year interim period post the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, the Commission did not have sole right of initiative. In this case, given 
the history of the Regulation, Germany and Finland revived the Convention text more 
or less as it stood, leading to a lack of Commission proposal (and explanatory Mem-
orandum) and, given the streamlined decision-making procedure, neither any exten-
sive Parliament involvement. The Regulation’s travaux préparatoires in other words 
are thin on the ground, making the Virgos-Schmit Report an important (if unofficial 
and never formally adopted) reference. The eventual Regulation tries to pre-empt 
some of the perhaps expected controversy by making full albeit not unusual use of 
recitals.
The Regulation does not apply to Denmark, which has created one or two peculiar 
difficulties.
Finally, the Regulation’s provisions on applicable law have not been materially 
changed by the revision and I shall therefore not address them in this contribution. In 
short, unless otherwise stated by the Regulation, the law of the State of the opening 
of proceedings is applicable. (This is a case of ‘Gleichlauf’ between applicable law 
and jurisdiction). The general rule inevitably had to be adapted for quite a number of 
instances. In certain cases, the Regulation excludes some rights over assets located 
abroad from the effects of the insolvency proceedings; in other cases, it ensures that 
certain effects of the insolvency proceedings are governed not by the law of the State 
of the opening, but by the law of another State, defined in the abstract. Of particular 
note are third parties’ rights in rem, employment contracts, and ‘detrimental acts’.13
10 OJ [2000] L160/1.
11 See e.g. A Ragan, COMI Strikes a Discordant Note 27 Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal 
117–168 (2010).
12 Virgos-Schmit Report on the Convention of Insolvency Proceedings. The Report accompanies 
the Convention, which was never adopted, hence it was not published in the Official Journal. It can be 
downloaded via the archives of European integration, e.g. via <http://aei.pitt.edu/952>, last consulted 
25 July 2015. 
13 On this see Case C-557/13 Lutz, ECLI:EU:C:2015:227, and G van Calster, ‘Lex causae, securitisa-
tion and insulating agreements from the lex concursus. The ECJ in Lutz’, <http://www.gavclaw.com>, 
24 July 2015, last consulted 28 July 2015.
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1.2 The Road to the Changes to the 2000 Regulation.
The EIR 2015 is the result of an entire ‘insolvency package’, which was adopted by 
the European Commission (‘EC’) in December 2012.14 Article 46 of Regulation 
1346/2000 included a now familiar clause instructing the EC to issue a report on the 
functioning of the Regulation, with, if necessary, a proposal for amendment: the pac-
age is the result of this whole exercise. The whole package comprises the proposal to 
revise Regulation 1346/2000,15 the Hess /Oberha mmer /Pfeiffer /Pieckenbrock /
Seagon Report on the application of that Regulation,16 the Commission Report on 
same,17 an Impact Assessment18 and a Communication on a new European approach 
on business failure and insolvency.19 That latter Communication was later supple-
mented with a Recommendation,20 in which the Commission again observed the lack 
of harmonisation at the applicable, and substantive law level. The Recommendation 
includes among others guidelines on the facilitation of negotiations for business 
restructuring.
12 years is not necessarily sufficient truly to assess the strengths and weaknesses 
of any piece of regulation. However it was clear that there were some cracks which 
showed in the practical roll-out of the Regulation’s provisions, particularly in the light 
of the rather dramatic economic rollercoaster in which the Regulation functioned from 
2000 onwards. The five points which the Commission itself identified as core to the 
reform,21 would indeed seem to correspond to what practice perceived as being areas 
of concern. Firstly, the scope. The former Regulation, in particular through its abstract 
definitions, confined the workings of the regime to terminal, bankruptcy proceedings 
only. The current Regulation encompasses a much wider range of hybrid and pre-
insolvency proceedings. Next, the jurisdictional rules are tidied up, in particular by 
inserting a properly defined concept of ‘COMI’. Further, secondary proceedings are 
no longer left to their own devices. The new Regulation tightens co-operation between 
main and secondary proceedings; leaves more discretion to courts whether or not to 
open secondary proceedings, and gets rid off the requirement that secondary proceed-
ings always be winding-up proceedings. Publicity of various legal actions relating to 
insolvency is much improved and organised at the European level. And finally, a 
14 ‘Giving honest businesses a second chance: Commission proposes modern insolvency rules’, 
IP/12/1354, 12 December 2015, available via <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-1354_en.htm> 
or <ow.ly/Q1x1H>, last consulted 24 July 2015.
15 COM (2012) 744.
16 B. Hess, P Oberhammer, T Pfeiffer, A Pieckenbrock, C Seagon, External Evaluation of Regula-
tion 1346/2000 on Insolvency Proceedings, December 2012, available at <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/
civil/files/evaluation_insolvency_en.pdf> or <ow.ly/Q1ymC>, last consulted 24 July 2015.
17 COM(2012) 743.
18 SWD (2012) 416, available via <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/insolvency-ia_en.pdf> or 
<ow.ly/Q1zUT>, last consulted 24 July 2015.
19 COM (2012) 742.
20 Commission Recommendation of 12 March 2014 on a new approach to business failure and 
insolvency, C(2014) 1500.
21 Note 14 above.
THE REVIEW OF THE EUROPEAN INSOLVENCY REGULATION [2016] EBLR 739
considerable set of rules are introduced to facilitate the proper co-ordination of insol-
vency proceedings relating to groups of companies.
A first observation when comparing the old and new version of the EIR is that the 
Regulation, and its recitals, have almost doubled in size. That is in some measure due 
to the introduction of an entirely new chapter for group insolvency.
2. Scope: The Definition of Insolvency Proceedings
Article 1(1) of the former EIR provided that:
‘This Regulation shall apply to collective insolvency proceedings which entail the 
partial or total divestment of a debtor and the appointment of a liquidator.’
It then defined most of these concepts in turn in Article 2. The combined application 
of these Articles with the associated Annexes meant that the Member States furnished 
the scope of application of the Regulation by virtue of their inclusion, or not, relevant 
procedures in Annex. It was not sufficient that national proceedings met the condi-
tions of Article 1 in a generic way, for them to be included in the scope of application 
of the Regulation. The Virgos-Schmit Report was clear on this point.22 In Bank Han-
dlowy23 the ECJ moreover confirmed that when a procedure is included in the Annex, 
upon proposal by the Member State, the EU or indeed the courts in other Member 
States are not to second-guess whether these are ‘true’ insolvency proceedings. ‘Insol-
vency’ may be a substantial condition for the Regulation to apply, however it is not 
defined by it.
Under the former EIR, Member States in practice could make reorganisation etc., 
outside the formal bankruptcy context subject to the EIR by virtue of including the 
relevant procedure in Annex. Therefore in reality, a Member State arguably need not 
have waited until the amendment of the Regulation, to ensure that its re-organisation 
procedures were caught by the regime. (If that is what it wanted. As I review below, 
sometimes it is more interesting not to have reorganisation be caught by the EIR).
The EIR 2015 confirms the wider approach beyond doubt, in line with the EC’s 
objectives as highlighted above. The core definition of insolvency proceeding, previ-
ously spread over Article 1 and 2, has been somewhat better integrated although it is 
still spread over Articles 1 and 2. It now reads:
‘This Regulation shall apply to public collective proceedings, including interim 
proceedings, which are based on laws relating to insolvency and in which, for the 
purpose of rescue, adjustment of debt, reorganisation or liquidation:
22 Virgos-Schmit Report, para. 48, p 32. 
23 Case C-116/11 Bank Handlowy w Warszawie SA and PPHU «ADAX»/Ryszard Adamiak v. Chris-
tianapol sp. z o.o.., ECLI:EU:C:2012:739. 
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(a) a debtor is totally or partially divested of its assets and an insolvency prac-
titioner is appointed;
(b) the assets and affairs of a debtor are subject to control or supervision by a 
court; or
(c) temporary stay of individual enforcement proceedings is granted by a court 
or by operation of law, in order to allow for negotiations between the debtor 
and its creditors, provided that the proceedings in which the stay is granted 
provide for suitable measures to protect the general body of creditors, and, 
where no agreement is reached, are preliminary to one of the proceedings 
referred to in point (a) or (b).
Where the proceedings referred to in this paragraph may be commenced in situ-
ations where there is only a likelihood of insolvency, their purpose shall be to 
avoid the debtor’s insolvency or the cessation of the debtor’s business activities.
The proceedings referred to in this paragraph are listed in Annex A.’
The EIR 2015 emphasises its wider calling (not just liquidation but also reorganisa-
tion) by dropping the term ‘liquidator’ in favour of ‘insolvency practitioner’.
Some, but certainly not all, Member States have included a variety of restructuring 
mechanisms in their relevant Annexes. Recital 9 is very clear as to the fate of proce-
dures in- or excluded from the Annexes:
‘This Regulation should apply to insolvency proceedings which meet the condi-
tions set out in it, irrespective of whether the debtor is a natural person or a legal 
person, a trader or an individual. Those insolvency proceedings are listed exhaus-
tively in Annex A. In respect of the national procedures contained in Annex A, 
this Regulation should apply without any further examination by the courts of 
another Member State as to whether the conditions set out in this Regulation are 
met. National insolvency procedures not listed in Annex A should not be covered 
by this Regulation.’
Recital 9, combined with the definition of insolvency proceeding referred to above, 
represents an important boost to regulatory competition in the restructuring area. Ad 
nauseam, the Annex is the trigger and it is the Member States that pull it. In my view 
that renders nugatory many of the discussions which one could conceivably have vis-
à-vis the terminology of the EIR. For instance, in the absence of European harmoni-
sation of substantive insolvency law, what laws are ‘laws relating to insolvency’ must 
be left to the Member States. Any autonomous interpretation of the concept by the 
CJEU in my view would run counter the clear deference to national law expressed in 
the Annex system.
One of the elephants in the room are the English Schemes of Arrangement. These 
have gained considerable popularity for use by companies not registered in the UK, 
the most obvious attraction being the possibility of ‘cram down’ under the relevant 
English law (Part 26 of the Companies act 2006 (England and Wales). A Scheme of 
Arrangement allows a (qualified) majority of creditors to accept restructuring of the 
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company’s debt in spite of opposition by a minority, and to have that restructuring 
have binding effect on those unwilling creditors. Relevant case-law24 leaves the 
Scheme s firmly outside of the EIR and within the scope of application of the Brussels 
I Regulation.25 That Regulation facilitates jurisdiction of the English courts, in con-
trast with the EIR where jurisdiction is based on objective elements. Schemes of 
arrangement have had an important impact on the attraction of London as a basis for 
restructuring practice, arguably also leading continental European States to amend 
their insolvency laws in relevant parts.26 The Annex approach of the Regulation in 
my view would have sufficed to emphasise the exclusion of Schemes of Arrangement 
from the EIR. So as to leave no doubt, however, the UK succeeded in having a specific 
recital inserted to emphasise the point: recital 16:
This Regulation should apply to proceedings which are based on laws relating to 
insolvency. However, proceedings that are based on general company law not 
designed exclusively for insolvency situations should not be considered to be based 
on laws relating to insolvency. (…)
3. Relation with the Judgments Regulation (Brussels I Recast): To Dovetail 
or Not?
Recital 7 addresses the relation between the Brussels I Recast Regulation 1215/2012,27 
and the Insolvency Regulation:
‘Bankruptcy, proceedings relating the winding-up of insolvent companies or other 
legal persons, judicial arrangements, compositions and analogous proceedings 
and actions related to such proceedings are excluded from the scope of Regula-
tion (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council. Those 
proceedings should be covered by this Regulation. The interpretation of this Reg-
ulation should as much as possible avoid regulatory loopholes between the two 
instruments. However, the mere fact that a national procedure is not listed in 
Annex A to this Regulation should not imply that it is covered by Regulation (EU) 
No 1215/2012.’
Insolvency, as noted above, was excluded from the Judgments Regulation, Brussels 
I, (and from the 1968 Brussels Convention28 before it) because it was envisaged to be 
included in what eventually became the Insolvency Regulation. Consequently the 
24 See in particular Apcoa, [2014] EWHC 3849, and Van Gansewinkel, [2015] EWHC 2151.
25 Regulation 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil 
and commercial matters, OJ [2001] L12/1, and the Recast regulation 1215/2012, OJ [2012] L351/1.
26 See in Germany, the 2012 Gesetz zur weiteren Erleichterung der Sanierung von Unternehmen; 
In The Netherlands, currently in ist finalisation stages, the Govenrment program for the recalibration 
of insolvency law (Programma HerijkingFaillissementsrecht).
27 OJ [2012] L351/1.
28 Note 6 above.
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scope of application of the Judgments Regulation and the Insolvency Regulation 
evidently is determined by each other’s existence.
However whether they clearly ‘dovetail’ (i.e. slot into one another leaving no spare 
space; rather like the joint from which the expression takes its name) when it comes 
to their respective scope of application, is less clear.29
Nickel and Goeldner at para. 21,30 and Nortel Networ ks at para. 26,31 are often 
quoted in support of the dovetail. However Recital 7 usefully reminds us not to treat 
exclusion of Annex A EIR as automatically leading to inclusion in Brussels I recast. 
I do not in fact think the Report Jenard32 suggests that the Brussels Convention 
intended a pure parallel.33 That Report merely mentions the (never completed) Insol-
vency Convention being prepared and the need to pace the inclusion of bankruptcy 
etc., in European private international law. Rather it is the Schlosser Report which 
first in so many words suggests the need for dovetailing:34 (footnotes omitted)
‘leaving aside special bankruptcy rules for very special types of business under-
takings, the two Conventions were intended to dovetail almost completely with 
each other. Consequently, the preliminary draft Convention on bankruptcy, which 
was fi rst drawn up in 1970, submitted in an amended form in 1975, deliberately 
adopted the principal terms ‘bankruptcy compositions’ and ‘analogous proceed-
ings in the provisions concerning its scope in the same way as they were used in 
the 1968 Convention.’
29 At any rate any dovetailing does not extend to matters of choice of law. That is because neither 
Lugano nor the Judgments Regulation consider choice of law: they are limited to jurisdiction. See 
Snowden J in re Van Gansewinkel, n 24 above.
30 Case C-157/13 Nickel & Goeldner Spedition GmbH v. Kintra UAB, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2145, 
para. 21: ‘In this respect, it should be noted that, relying inter alia on the preparatory documents relat-
ing to the [Brussels Convention], which was replaced by Regulation No 44/2001, the Court has held 
that that regulation and Regulation No1346/2000 must be interpreted in such a way as to avoid any 
overlap between the rules of law that those texts lay down and an y legal vacuum. Accordingly, actions 
excluded, under Art. 1(2)(b) of Regulation No 44/2001, from the application of that regulation in so 
far as they come under ‘bankruptcy, proceedings relating to the winding-up of insolvent companies or 
other legal persons, judicial arrangements, compositions and analogous proceedings’ fall within the 
scope of Regulation No 1346/2000. Following the same reasoning, actions which fall outside the scope 
of Article 3(1) of Regulation No 1346/2000 fall within the scope of Regulation No 44/2001 (judgment 
in F-Tex, C -213/10, EU:C:2012:215, paragraphs 21, 29 and 48).’
31 Case C-649/13, Comité d’entreprise de Nortel Networks SA and others v. Cosme Rogeau et al., 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:384, at 26, quoting quasi verbatim from Nickel & Goeldner, n 30 above.
32 Report by P Jenard on the Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil 
and commercial matters, OJ [1979] C59/1.
33 As suggested by A Layton, and H Mercer (General eds.), with H Mercer, L Wyles, C Dougherty 
and P de Verneuil Smith (ass.eds.), and S O’Malley (consultant ed.), European Civil Practice, 356–357 
(2nd ed., Vol.1, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2004), referring to the Report Jenard.
34 Report by P Schlosser on the convention on the Association of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland 
and the United Kingdom to the convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil 
and commercial matters and to the Protocol on its interpretation by the Court of Justice, OJ [1979] 
C59(71) 90.
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In German Graphics however the CJEU itself notes that ‘it is conceivable that, among 
those judgments, there are some judgments which will come within the scope of appli-
cation neither of Regulation No 1346/2000 nor of Regulation No 44/2001.’35
Whatever the intention of the Brussels Convention, the way in which the EIR (old 
and new) has defined its scope of application, has arguably upset any dovetailing that 
might have been intended. The eventual text of the former and 2015 EIR, and addi-
tionally the relevance of inclusion in the Annex, clearly show that the absolute paral-
lel cannot be maintained in practice. Starting with the definition, the Jenard Report 
employs a definition which certainly does not entirely overlap with the definition in 
either former or new EIR:
‘Article 1 (2) excludes bankruptcy, proceedings relating to the winding-up of 
insolvent companies or other legal persons judicial arrangements compositions 
and analogous proceedings, i.e. those proceedings which depending on the system 
of law involved, are based on the suspension of payments, the Insolvency of the 
debtor or his inability to raise credit, and which involve the judicial authorities 
for the purpose either compulsory and collective liquidation of the assets or sim-
ply of supervision.’36
Further and as noted, neither Report Jenard, Schlosser or the Brussels Convention 
itself would have envisaged the Member States being in the definitional driver’s seat, 
as a result of the Annex approach as reviewed above.
4. Determination of COMI and ‘Look Back’ Periods
4.1 The Guiding Principles following from the Former EIR
A core jurisdictional trigger in the EIR is the debtor’s ‘Centre of Main Interests’ or 
‘COMI’. ‘Main proceedings’ can only be opened by a court in the Member State of 
COMI. Those proceedings comprise all assets of the debtor, wherever located (in- or 
outside of the EU). COMI however was not defined in the former EIR. It was recital 
13 which furnished the definition:
The “centre of main interests” should correspond to the place where the debtor 
conducts the administration of his interests on a regular basis and is therefore 
ascertainable by third parties.
Both elements had to be present simultaneously. Ascertainability by third parties in 
particular is a core safeguard. It is crucial for such parties’ confidence especially in 
35 Case C-292/08 German Graphics Graphische Maschinen GmbH v. Alice van der Schee, [2009] 
ECR I-8421, at 17.
36 Note 32 above, 11 in fine-12.
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dealing with business partners with whom they have done none of very little business 
before. The Virgos-Schmit report clarified:37
 – The use of the term “interests”, was intended to show that not only commercial, 
industrial or professional activities are caught by the Regulation, but also general 
economic activities. This therefore includes the activities of private individuals 
(e.g. consumers).
 – The expression “main” serves as a criterion for the cases where these interests 
include activities of different types which are run from different centres.
In principle, the centre of main interests will in the case of professionals be the place 
of their professional domicile and for natural persons in general, the place of their 
habitual residence. (‘Habitual residence’ is not actually employed as a criterion in the 
former EIR).
Where companies and legal persons are concerned, the former EIR in Article 3(1) 
presumed, unless proved to the contrary, that the debtor’s centre of main interests is 
the ‘place of the registered office’. The Virgos-Schmit Report adds that this place 
normally corresponds to the debtor’s ‘head office’, however this is a concept which 
in itself is open to a great many interpretations. In practice, national courts have been 
quite happy to set aside the presumption (as Article 3(1) specifically allows them to), 
giving it arguably a lot less weight than perhaps had been assumed by the drafters of 
the Regulation.38 The CJEU itself had sin gled out mailbox companies as not being 
in a position simply to claim the protection of the State in which they are incorporated:
‘in determining the centre of the main interests of a debtor company, the simple 
presumption laid down by the Community legislature in favour of the registered 
offi ce of that company can be rebutted only if factors which are both objective 
and ascertainable by third parties enable it to be established that an actual situ-
ation exists which is different from that which locating it at that registered offi ce 
is deemed to refl ect. That could be so in particular in the case of a ‘letterbox’ 
company not carrying out any business in the territory of the Member State in 
which its registered offi ce is situated.’39
CJEU and national case-law led to the following main principles on the interpretation 
of COMI:
 – A need for autonomous interpretation, in line with the general approach of the 
European court in the application of European private international law;
 – The importance of the objectivity of the test and the ascertainability by third 
parties /(potential) creditors.
37 Note 12 above, para. 75, p 51 ff.
38 P Wautelet,Some Considerations on the Center of Main Interests as Jurisdictional Test under the 
European Insolvency Regulation, in G Affaki (ed), Cross-border Insolvency and Conflicts of Jurisdic-
tions: A US-EU Experience,73, 86ff (Brussels, Bruylant, 2007).
39 Case C-341/04 Eurofood IFSC [2006] ECR I-3813, para. 34–35.
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 – The individuality of COMI in the case of groups of companies. The Regulation 
itself contains no specific rules on determining COMI for groups of companies, 
neither did the draft Convention.40 Each debtor constituting a distinct legal entity 
is subject to its own COMI determination.41 The mere fact that a daughter com-
pany’s economic choices are or can be controlled by a parent company in another 
Member State is not enough to rebut the presumption laid down by Article 3(1) 
of the Regulation.42
4.2 The Provisions of the EIR 2015
COMI is now defined in the EIR proper: Article 3(1): ‘(…)The centre of main inter-
ests shall be the place where the debtor conducts the administration of its interests 
on a regular basis and which is ascertainable by third parties.’
The EIR 2015 has expanded and clarified the presumptions of COMI and has also 
provided a qualified look-back period for change of COMI. Both corporations and 
individuals can and do of course legitimately move their COMI. However one of the 
main drivers of the Regulation is to avoid abusive forum shopping, whereby debtors 
move COMI simply to shop for a regime which will be attractive to them but not to 
their creditors.
To assist genuine change in COMI, Recital 28 emphasises, in line with the main 
principles recalled above, the relevance of ascertainability by third parties also in the 
event of a shift in COMI. It adds a number of practical precautions which the debtor 
could take to ensure that an intended shift in COMI actually will be recognised as 
such:
‘This may require, in the event of a shift of centre of main interests, informing 
creditors of the new location from which the debtor is carrying out its activities 
in due course, for example by drawing attention to the change of address in com-
mercial correspondence, or by making the new location public through other 
appropriate means.’
More generally, the EIR 2015 has expanded COMI presumptions as follows: Article 
3(1):
The courts of the Member State within the territory of which the centre of the 
debtor’s main interests is situated shall have jurisdiction to open insolvency 
proceedings (‘main insolvency proceedings’). The centre of main interests shall 
40 Virgos-Schmit Report, para. 76, p 52.
41 See the opposite view, prior to the Eurofood judgment, In re Collins & Aikman Corp. Group, 
[2005] EWHC 1754 (Ch), in which the High Court addressed COMI vis-a-vis Michigan-based company 
with twenty-four corporations registered in the EU. The group was treated as a single unit. 
42 Note 39 above, para. 30 ff. 
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be the place where the debtor conducts the administration of its interests on a 
regular basis and which is ascertainable by third parties.
 In the case of a company or legal person, the place of the registered office shall 
be presumed to be the centre of its main interests in the absence of proof to the 
contrary. That presumption shall only apply if the registered office has not been 
moved to another Member State within the 3-month period prior to the request 
for the opening of insolvency proceedings.
 In the case of an individual exercising an independent business or professional 
activity, the centre of main interests shall be presumed to be that individual’s 
principal place of business in the absence of proof to the contrary. That presump-
tion shall only apply if the individual’s principal place of business has not been 
moved to another Member State within the 3-month period prior to the request 
for the opening of insolvency proceedings.
 In the case of any other individual, the centre of main interests shall be pre-
sumed to be the place of the individual’s habitual residence in the absence of 
proof to the contrary. This presumption shall only apply if the habitual residence 
has not been moved to another Member State within the 6-month period prior to 
the request for the opening of insolvency proceedings.
Rather than just the one presumption in the former EIR for companies or legal per-
sons, the EIR 2015 introduces presumptions of COMI for all three categories of 
insolvable persons. For neither of the three categories does the Regulation introduce 
a negation of move of COMI within a prescribed period. Rather, it introduces look-
back periods (3 months for corporations and individuals exercising an independent 
business or professional activity; six months for individuals not carrying out such 
activity) in which the presumption will no longer hold. Change of COMI in that period 
immediately preceding a filing for insolvency can still be substantiated however then 
purely following the COMI criteria of Article 3(1), recalled above.
5. The Insolvency of Groups of Companies and ‘Group Coordination 
Proceedings’
5.1 The Entity-by-Entity Approach is Maintained
In Eurofood,43 as noted, the Court of Justice insisted on determination of COMI for 
each separate undertaking. The CJEU therefore defers to the corporate veil and in my 
view is right to do so. Of note is of course that the finding in Eurofood does not 
exclude that COMI for highly integrated groups of companies may be found to be in 
one and the same place. Ad hoc rebuttal of the registered office presumption in favour 
of the registered office of the holding company, is most definitely a possibility.
43 Note 39 above.
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The EC did not in principle question the what it calls ‘entity-by-entity’ approach 
for determining COMI. Instead, it proposed better co-ordination between the insol-
vency proceedings, using in particular procedural safeguards to enable liquidators of 
the various companies of the group to have a say in each other’s procedure. The 
European Parliament strengthened the co-ordination element by inserting ‘group 
coordination proceedings’, which we further review below.
The Regulation (Article 2(13)) defines a ‘group of companies’ as:
‘a parent undertaking and all its subsidiary undertakings’.
A ‘parent undertaking’ in turn is defined as:
‘an undertaking which controls, either directly or indirectly, one or more subsid-
iary undertakings. An undertaking which prepares consolidated fi nancial state-
ments in accordance with Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and 
of the Council shall be deemed to be a parent undertaking’.
The rather detailed rules for groups of companies, most of them speaking for them-
selves, take the form of a whole new Chapter in the Regulation, dealing with what 
the Regulation calls on the one hand ‘cooperation and communication’, and on the 
other hand ‘coordination’. Each of these apply to both courts and insolvency practi-
tioners.
Of note is also that the EIR 2015 strengthens cooperation and communication 
between insolvency practitioners and courts in the event of one single company (in 
that case coordination between main and secondary proceedings being the obvious 
aim).
5.2 Cooperation and Communication for Groups of Companies
As far as cooperation and communication is concerned, the proof of the Group of 
Companies chapter will lie in both the goodwill and the procedural limits to which 
courts and practitioners in the Member States are subject. The Chapter in relevant 
part talks of standing of the insolvency practitioners in each other’s proceedings, of 
exchange of information, of the option to conclude agreements to all these effects, 
etc. However each of these possibilities (! with the exception of group coordination 
proceedings: see below) is qualified by reference to both national procedural law, to 
conflict of interest, and to the sound administration of justice. In other words there 
are likely to be plenty of remaining options for recalcitrant jurisdictions to refuse to 
co-operate. In fairness, in many such group proceedings practitioners and courts cur-
rently already explore co-operation. The clear instructions to that effect in the Regu-
lation undoubtedly will assist in stretching current procedural options in the Member 
States to assist further cooperation.
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5.3 Group Coordination Proceedings
The one innovation backed up by hard law provisions in the Regulation, is the intro-
duction of ‘group coordination proceedings’.
As noted, it was the European Parliament which suggested these proceedings. 
Parliament had also suggested to assign group coordination to the jurisdiction of 
COMI of the member of the group which performs ‘crucial functions’. Parliament’s 
proposed amendment on this issue read:44
Opening of group coordination proceedings
1. Group coordination proceedings may be brought by an insolvency represen-
tative in any court having jurisdiction over the insolvency proceedings of a 
member of the group, provided that:
a) insolvency proceedings with respect to that member of the group are 
pending; and
b) the members of the group having their centre of main interests in the 
Member State of the court seised to open the group coordination pro-
ceedings perform crucial functions within the group.
2. Where more than one court is seised to open group coordination proceed-
ings, the group coordination proceedings shall be opened in the Member 
State where the most crucial functions within the group are performed. To 
that extent the courts seised shall communicate and cooperate with each 
other in accordance with Article 42b. Where the most crucial functions cannot 
be determined, the first court seised may open group coordination proceed-
ings provided that the conditions for opening such proceedings are satisfied.
3. Where group coordination proceedings have been opened, the right of insol-
vency representatives to request a stay of the proceedings in accordance 
with point (b) of Article 42d(1) shall be subject to the approval of the coor-
dinator. Existing stays shall remain in force and effect, subject to the coor-
dinator’s power to request the cessation of any such stay.
‘Crucial functions within the group’ in turn were defined as:
 (i) the ability, prior to the opening of insolvency proceedings with respect to 
any member of the group, to take and enforce decisions of strategic relevance 
for the group or parts of it; or
 (ii) the economic significance within the group, which shall be presumed if the 
group member or members contribute at least 10 per cent to the consolidated 
balance-sheet total and consolidated turnover.
It is clear that the ‘crucial functions’ criterion was likely to drag the EP’s innovation 
into practical controversy. Consequently Council (and Commission) supported the 
idea of group coordination proceedings, bar the ‘crucial functions’ jurisdictional trig-
44 EP legislative resolution of 5 February 2014, P7_TA(2014) 0093.
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ger. In the absence of choice of court, Article 62 now instead has a strict lis alibi 
pendens rule:
‘Without prejudice to Article 66, where the opening of group coordination pro-
ceedings is requested before courts of different Member States, any court other 
than the court fi rst seised shall decline jurisdiction in favour of that court.’
Combined with Article 61’s rule that such proceedings may be requested before any 
court having jurisdiction over the insolvency proceedings of a member of the group, 
inevitably Article 62 will trigger race to court for the establishment of the group 
coordination proceedings. However this was seen as preferable to the difficult deter-
mination of ‘crucial functions’.
Article 63 obliges the court seized to check the request to open group coordination 
proceedings against the following criteria:
(a) the opening of such proceedings is appropriate to facilitate the effective 
administration of the insolvency proceedings relating to the different group 
members
(b) no creditor of any group member expected to participate in the proceedings 
is likely to be financially disadvantaged by the inclusion of that member in 
such proceedings; and
(c) the proposed coordinator fulfils the requirements laid down in Article 71.
Article 71 in turn insists among others that the coordinator cannot be chosen from 
among the midst of the insolvency practitioners involved in each of the members of 
the group’s insolvency.
Among these criteria, the proviso that ‘no creditor of any group member expected 
to participate in the proceedings is likely to be financially disadvantaged by the inclu-
sion of that member in such proceedings’ is likely to be the toughest to apply. It 
presumably requires an overall assessment of the net return after insolvency, rather 
than just an assessment in absolute terms. However how exactly ‘competing’ insol-
vency regimes (for jurisdiction to a large degree also leads to applicable law) are to 
be compared in this assessment is not clear at all.
It is only after being satisfied that Article 63’s criteria are met, that the court seized 
gives notice of the request to all other insolvency practitioners of the group. The court 
seized has to give all insolvency practitioners involved the opportunity to be heard. 
Article 63 does not state so in so many words however presumably after having heard 
the practitioners concerned, the court has to revisit its assessment of Article 63’s 
criteria.
The reference in Article 62 to Article 66, is to that Article’s choice of court provi-
sions:
 ‘1. Where at least two-thirds of all insolvency practitioners appointed in 
insolvency proceedings of the members of the group have agreed that a court 
of another Member State having jurisdiction is the most appropriate court 
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for the opening of group coordination proceedings, that court shall have 
exclusive jurisdiction.
 2. The choice of court shall be made by joint agreement in writing or evi-
denced in writing. It may be made until such time as group coordination 
proceedings have been opened in accordance with Article 68.
 3. Any court other than the court seised under paragraph 1 shall decline 
jurisdiction in favour of that court.
 4. The request for the opening of group coordination proceedings shall be 
submitted to the court agreed in accordance with Article 61.’
Article 66’s two thirds majority rule applies therefore even if one of the objecting 
insolvency practitioners has won the race to court. It avoids the proceedings being 
hijacked by a minority. This effectively amounts to cram-down of choice of court for 
group coordination proceedings.
Interestingly, Article 66 does not mention the need for the choice of court to have to 
abide by the aforementioned criteria of Article 63. This gives the 2/3 majority of 
insolvency practitioners a much wider remit to select the exclusive jurisdiction.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the exclusive jurisdiction provision in this title 
applies to group coordination proceedings only. The underlying jurisdiction for main 
or secondary proceedings is not affected. If and when a group coordinator is assigned, 
the EIR assigns him or her overall co-ordination and planning tasks (Article 72) as 
well as a wide remit to request information, to be heard, and to provide input into all 
national proceedings.
6. Secondary Insolvency Proceedings
Local insolvency proceedings following the activities of a debtor in that locality, but 
with COMI elsewhere, continue to be treated with caution in the EIR. Their inclusion 
at all in the Regulation upsets the universality of the proceedings in the Member State 
of COMI. On the other hand they clearly can be of use in assisting with the main 
proceedings, especially in the realisation of local assets (this would be more challeng-
ing to organise entirely from the Member State of COMI). Moreover they protect 
creditors in Member States other than that of COMI in the event the laws of that 
Member State do not (yet) allow for opening of the proceedings.
In an attempt to limit the impact on universality, the former EIR attached different 
conditions to local proceedings depending on whether proceedings in the Member 
State of COMI had already been opened. If no such opening had occurred, then the 
local proceeding, aimed at the assets located in that territory, is referred to as a ‘ter-
ritorial’ insolvency proceeding. From the moment proceedings are opened in the 
Member State of COMI, any ‘territorial’ proceedings are renamed ‘secondary pro-
ceedings’. Precisely because they are also required in the event the laws of the Mem-
ber State of COMI do not allow for opening of proceedings, local creditors deserve 
the protection of local insolvency proceedings: these territorial proceedings therefore 
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can be both winding-up and restructuring proceedings. The former EIR, however, 
prescribed that secondary proceedings, by contrast, always had to be winding-up 
proceedings: see in this respect very clearly Article 3(3) in fine: ‘These latter proceed-
ings must be winding-up proceedings’.
I found the philosophy behind this never quite satisfactorily explained, in spite of 
valiant effort in scholarship.45 The net result, I would suggest, is that a restructuring 
effort in the Member State of COMI may quite effectively be undermined. At the very 
least the negotiation position of relevant parties is seriously strengthened, by credi-
tors’ insistence, indeed threat that they will open secondary proceedings. Such move 
effectively lifts the assets in that Member State from the restructuring effort. (Although 
the courts in the secondary State may be able to apply local conditions for winding-up 
in a way which does not jeopardise such co-ordination).
It is this negative impact on the proper restructuring effort in the Member State of 
COMI, which has now led to the EIR 2015 dropping the condition that secondary 
proceedings must be winding-up proceedings. The aforementioned sentence no lon-
ger features in the EIR 2015.
The EIR 2015 has also amended the definition of ‘establishment’ (only those Mem-
ber States where the debtor has an establishment may open secondary proceedings). 
The former EIR defined it as ‘any place of operations where the debtor carries out a 
non-transitory economic activity with human means and goods’. The Court of Justice 
has specified this somewhat more practically in Interedil as46 ‘a structure with a 
minimum level of organisation and a degree of stability for the purpose of pursuing 
an economic activity’, basically a combination of pursuit of an economic activity and 
the presence of human resources. This has to be determined in the same way as the 
location of the centre of main interests, namely on the basis of objective factors which 
are ascertainable by third parties.47
A good illustration is Olympic Airways,48 in which the Court of Appeal for England 
and Wales combined Interedil and further CJEU guidance with respect to COMI, as 
well as extensive reference to the Virgos Schmit Report, to hold that the Regulation’s 
definition of “establishment” a meaning which requires more to its “economic activ-
ity” than the mere process of winding-up. In the words of Sir Bernard Rix (at 33) ‘The 
definition is clearly intended to lay down a rule that the mere presence of an office 
or branch, a “place” at which the debtor is located, is not sufficient. It has to be a 
place “of operations”: human and physical resources have to be involved in those 
operations; and there has to be “economic activity” involving those resources.‘ He 
also emphasised that this economic activity needs to be ‘external’, i.e. market ori-
ented. Of note is also the temporal element: per Office Metro49 the possibility to open 
45 See G Moss, I.F Fletcher and S Isaacs (eds.), n 3 above, p 51; and M Virgos and F Garcimartin, 
The European Insolvency Regulation: Law and Practice, 157–158 (The Hague, Kluwer, 2004).
46 Case C-396/09 Interedil, [2011] ECR I-9915, para. 62. 
47 Ibid., para. 63.
48 [2013] EWCA Civ 643.
49 [2012] EWHC 1191 (Ch).
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up secondary proceedings requires there to be such establishment at the time of the 
request for opening of such proceeding. The UK Supreme Court later confirmed.50
The EIR 2015 now defines ‘establishment’ as ‘any place of operations where a 
debtor carries out or has carried out in the 3-month period prior to the request to 
open main insolvency proceedings a non-transitory economic activity with human 
means and assets’. ‘Assets’ replaces ‘goods’, which is quite helpful especially in a 
services economy. Moreover the 3-month period is another way in which the Regula-
tion discourages forum shopping.
7. Other Provisions
Of particular practical note are the provisions in the EIR 2015 dealing with the inter-
connection of insolvency registers (Article 25). The need for this has repeatedly been 
highlighted.51 Specifically, it is almost impossible to require bona fide parties (banks 
in particular) not to carry out transactions which have a negative impact on the col-
lective creditors affected by the insolvency, lest these third parties dispose of a means 
to verify their counterparty’s insolvent status. The EC is to adopt the necessary imple-
menting regulation to enable the interconnection, which will be materialised inter alia 
via the EU’s E-Justice portal. Data protection is one of the concerns which need to 
be addressed in the roll-out of the register.
8. Applicability in Time
As noted, the EIR 2015 will apply to insolvency proceedings opened after 26 June 
2017 (Article 84 and Article 92). ‘Opened’ requires formal opening by a Member 
State’s judicial authorities, within the meaning of Article 2(7) EIR 2015. It does not 
refer to the date of a request to open those proceedings.52
The former EIR has been repealed from 25 June 2015 (see Article 92 with respect 
to entry into force) however in accordance with Article 84(2) it shall continue to apply 
to insolvency proceedings which have been opened before 26 June 2017 (and pro-
vided of course these proceedings are within the scope of the former, not the new, 
EIR).
Article 84 (1), second sentence (which existed as Article 43, second sentence), 
solves the conflit mobile53 which might arise as a result of the interim period between 
50 The Trustees of the Olympic Airlines Sa Pension and Life Assurance Scheme v. Olympic Airways 
SA, [2015] UKSC 27.
51 For instance in the circumstances of Case C-251/12 van Buggenhout/van de Mierop, ECLI:EU: 
C:2013:566, and G van Calster, ‘van Buggenhout /van de Mierop: ECJ disagrees with its AG re protec-
tion of debtors’, <http://www.gavclaw.com>, 20 September 2013, last consulted 28 July 2015.
52 Case C-1/04 Susanne Staubitz-Schreiber, [2006] ECR I-701 (re Art. 43 of the former EIR).
53 A conflit mobile in the narrow sense occurs when the factual matrix included in the connecting 
factor changes. A classic example would be a change in nationality (a relevant connecting factor in much 
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acts committed by a debtor (classic example: contracts entered into), and that debtor 
subsequently being the subject of an insolvency proceeding. If that proceeding is 
opened after 26 June 2017, the acts committed by a debtor before that date shall con-
tinue to be governed by the law which was applicable to them at the time they were 
committed. The EIR 2015 then covers all other, procedural aspects of the insolvency.
The rather quick succession of two insolvency regimes (2000 and 2014) means in 
practice that quite a few insolvencies which procedurally might be subject to the EIR 
2015, involve ‘acts committed by a debtor’ stretching back to before the entry into 
force of the former EIR. Article 84’s (and before it: Article 43’s) intention may be 
simple, namely to prevent retroactive application of the applicable conflict of law 
rules.54 However in practice the split between applicable law and applicable procedure 
in my view may55 create more practical complication than it solves.
of family law) or a change in contractual terms (e.g. parties amend the agreed place of delivery). In the 
context of the current article I propose to apply it to a change in the conflict of laws rule.
54 See M Virgos and F Garcimartin, n 45 above, p 31–32.
55 Discussion in scholarship is vague to non-existent, and in case-law the issue would not seem to 
have featured abundantly. 
